Reciprocity in Human-Robot Interaction: A Quantitative Approach Through the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Ultimatum Game by Sandoval, E. B. et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Reciprocity in Human-Robot Interaction
A Quantitative Approach Through The Prisoner’s Dilemma And The Ultimatum
Game
Eduardo Benitez Sandoval · Jürgen Brandstetter · Mohammad Obaid ·
Christoph Bartneck
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Reciprocity [48] is an important factor in
human-human interaction (HHI), so it can be expected
that it should also play a major role in Human-Robot
Interaction (HRI). Participants in our study played the
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (RPDG) and the
mini Ultimatum Game (mUG) with robot and human
agents, with the agents using either Tit for Tat (TfT)
or Random strategies. As part of the study we also
measured the perceived personality traits in the agents
using the TIPI test after every round of RPDG and
mUG. The results show that the participants collabo-
rated more with humans than with a robot, however
they tended to be equally reciprocal with both agents.
The experiment also showed the TfT strategy as the
most profitable strategy; affecting collaboration, recip-
rocation, profit and joint profit in the game. Most of the
participants tended to be fairer with the human agent
in mUG. Furthermore, robots were perceived as less
open and agreeable than humans. Consciousness, extro-
version and emotional stability were perceived roughly
the same in humans and robots. TfT strategy became
associated with an extroverted and agreeable person-
ality in the agents. We could observe that the norm
of reciprocity applied in Human-Robot Interaction has
potential implications for robot design.
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1 Introduction
Companion robots are a subset of social robots and
service robots which will become popular in the near
future. Dautenhahn et al. described them as robots de-
signed for personal use, capable of performing multi-
ple tasks and interacting with the users in an intu-
itive way [13]. Several studies in social robotics propose
the use of these robots in different scenarios. For ex-
ample as educators, caregivers in nursery houses, nan-
nies, housekeepers and assistants. In fact, important re-
search consortia like The Cognitive Robot Companion
1 and Robot Companions for Citizens 2 are investing re-
sources in the development of companion robots. More-
over, it is expected that users and robots develop short-
term and long-term relationships if companion robots
assume certain social roles in the life of the users. In
HRI, it is commonly used Human-Human Interaction
(HHI) as a reference to compare our robotic implemen-
tations. Besides, reciprocity is considered a cornerstone
of human social interaction [27]. For these reasons we
believe it could be valuable to develop studies about
how humans and robots will interact in terms of reci-
procity.
The simplest cultural reference for the concept of
reciprocity is ”If you do something for me, I will do
something for you.” Reciprocity is a very important fac-
tor in human social interaction, so it should be studied
in order to know how it influences the relationships of
1 www.cogniron.org
2 www.robotcompanions.eu
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humans and robots. Many of the interactions between
humans and robots involving cooperation, persuasion,
altruism, exchange of favors or mutual trust could de-
pend on reciprocity. In addition, it should be considered
that humans have a high capability to adapt to agents
when they are interacting with them depending of their
own personality traits. For instance, people could be re-
ciprocal with a robot by paying it back for its services
(taking care of the robot, giving technical maintenance,
etc) if the robot encourages reciprocity via certain social
strategy. Authors like Kahn et al. consider reciprocity
as a benchmark in the design of Human-Robot Interac-
tions [30] simply because reciprocity is present in other
human social situations. In other words, humans tend to
develop intricate relationships with pets, machines and
artifacts, consequently, it is expected that reciprocity
plays an important role in HRI. However, the question
is; do people reciprocate towards robots in a similar way
to how they reciprocate with humans?
We consider that an analysis of reciprocity in HRI
could be useful in order to design more engaging and
effective Human-Robot Interactions in different scenar-
ios. Some studies report that users do not feel engaged
enough with the robots and that they have high initial
expectations of them which decrease over time [7,16].
On the other hand, companion robots have not so far
had the expected impact in people’s lives, particularly
when they take care of particular users such as elderly
people [7] or children. Dautenhahn et al. found that
40% of the users liked the idea of a companion robot in
the home. In addition 96.4% of the users wanted a robot
capable of doing the housework. However a robot play-
ing a role in the human domain as friend or taking care
of children was acceptable to only 18% of the partici-
pants [13]. We propose that in the future, robots could
assume more social roles in the human domain if the
Human-Robot Interaction would be more reciprocal.
In this paper we analyze the reciprocity in HRI com-
pared with human-human interaction (HHI). We used
Game Theory insights in our experiment because this is
a powerful method to establish quantitatively a model
of reciprocity in HRI. Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(RPDG) and mini Ultimatum game (mUG) have been
used to model different social situations in HCI and
HRI, so we also used these decision games in order to
compare with that studies. Our results show that people
tend to be less cooperative with robots, however they
tend to be equally reciprocal with humans and robots.
Also we demonstrated that Tit for Tat (TfT) strategy
used by the robot is the most profitable strategy; affect-
ing collaboration, reciprocation, profit and joint profit
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Most of the partic-
ipants tended to be fairer with the human agent in
mUG. Furthermore, robots were perceived as less open
and agreeable than humans. Consciousness, extrover-
sion and emotional stability were perceived roughly the
same in humans and robots. TfT strategy became asso-
ciated with an extroverted and agreeable personality in
the agents. We can see that the Norm of Reciprocity ap-
plies in this Human-Robot Interaction, which has gen-
eralizable implications for robot design.
2 Reciprocity and HRI
In the sixties, Gouldner proposed the “Norm of Reci-
procity”, defined as “the compulsion to return a favor
or gift in human relationships” [27,45]. However in this
study we assume a more complete definition of reci-
procity proposed by Fehr and Gachter: “Reciprocity
means that in response to friendly actions, people are
frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than
predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in re-
sponse to hostile actions they are frequently much more
nasty and even brutal” [20]. This definition is in line
with the theory of reciprocity proposed by Falk and Fis-
chbacher [18] based on experimental work. The theory
explains a reciprocal action modeled as the behavioral
response to an action that is perceived as either kind or
unkind. In addition, reciprocity has been a well studied
topic in humanities, philosophy, social sciences and psy-
chology. Moreover reciprocity is connected with other
phenomena such as persuasion [10] cooperation [4] , al-
truism [33], friendship [11], love [35] and compassion
[55].
There are several studies about reciprocity in HRI
with different approaches. Kahn et al., [31] discovered
that children responded reciprocally and were more en-
gaged with an AIBO robot which offered some motion-
ing, behavioral and verbal stimulus than they were with
a toy dog. Specifically, they claim that reciprocity is
one of the benchmarks in the design of Human-Robot
Interaction. Moreover, Kahn et al., speculate with an
interesting question in HRI, which is: Can people en-
gage substantively in reciprocal relationships with hu-
manoids [30]? They argue that interactions involving
reciprocity with anthropomorphic robots can be sim-
ilar to human interactions [30]. Nass and Reeves have
conducted ample research about how people tend to an-
thropomorphize objects such as computers [41]. Conse-
quently, they conclude that humans could have similar
attitudes toward inanimate objects and humans. In a
very specific study Fogg and Nass demonstrated that
users tend to be reciprocal with computers that had
helped them previously [24].
More recently reciprocity has been very present in
the debate of social robotics. The workshop: “Taking
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care of Each Other: Synchronization and Reciprocity
for Social Companion Robots” in the International Con-
ference of Social Robotics 2013 discussed the impor-
tance of reciprocity in the design of companion robots.
Several studies presented in the workshop reviewed con-
cepts related to reciprocity as compassion, behavior
imitation or social cognition mechanisms integrated to
HRI [56] which could be the cornerstone in the develop-
ment of future meaningful Human-Robot Interactions.
For instance Weiss presented the project Hobbit [55],
a robot based in the “Mutual Care” paradigm pro-
posed by Lammer et al. [36]. They, like us, propose that
Human-Robot Interactions can improve if both par-
ties take care of each other in a similar way to human
human interactions. Furthermore, Lorenz claims that
mutual compassion (understanding Compassion as the
german word “Mitgefühl”) should be considered as an
important component in HRI due to this being a hu-
man ability based in synchronization and reciprocity.
The benefits of mutual understanding based in a re-
ciprocal relationship between humans and robots can
improve the performance of social companion robots
because of the resulting more intuitive behavior of the
robot [38]. However, Broz and Lehmann claim that reci-
procity is limited to certain HRI scenarios where robots
assist humans in some activities and humans assist the
robots in others. Although cooperation and reciprocity
are closely related, they do not necessarily appear to-
gether. For instance in jobs as caregivers, which could
be likely future roles for companion robots. The pa-
tients do not necessarily behave in a reciprocal manner
with the caregiver [8]. It could be because the robot
doesn’t encourage reciprocal behaviour. Likely this lack
of reciprocity in HRI can produce a depreciation of the
services provided by the robot. Consequently the con-
struction of a relationship will be degraded. We think
that reciprocity is especially important if the users need
the robot. If something happens to the robot but the
user does not care, user will suffer later a negative im-
pact on him/her because the robot could not do its
work. In our opinion other roles for companion robots
could require a more reciprocal behavior when a social
interaction is developed.
In terms of applications using the reciprocity con-
cept in HRI; there are several examples of how the de-
sign of reciprocal behaviors could be applied in Children
with Autism Spectrum Disorder [40] or elder care [36].
However a better understanding of reciprocity could
help to improve the current use of companion robots in
real applications like in the work presented by Broad-
bent et al., [7]. In that study robots did not have sig-
nificant impact on the quality of life of the patients,
depression or adherence. It is likely that a more recip-
rocal behavior of the robot could help to improve its
performance with the patient.
Additionally, decision games such as those played
in this study have been used to study different aspects
of HRI [50]. To illustrate, Nishio et al. [42] have stud-
ied how the appearance of robots affects participants
in an Ultimatum Game (UG). This game involves reci-
procity because two players interact to decide how they
will divide money or points in fair or unfair propos-
als. Nishio et al. conclude that people show changes
in their attitude depending on the agents appearance.
The agent (robot, human or computer) in the role of
proposer influences the number of the rejections of the
proposals. In particular an android appearance is asso-
ciated with a higher number of rejections. Possibly not
enough human likeness in the android’s appearance is
a main factor. In addition, Torta et al. used Ultimatum
Game online to measure the perceived degree of anthro-
pomorphism among a human agent, a humanoid robot
and a computer. In that study, participants took more
time to respond to the offer of a computer compared to
that of the robot [53].
Despite the importance of reciprocity in HCI and
HRI, the area has still not been explored enough. The
research related with reciprocity is mainly focused in
persuasion, negotiation and cooperation. Apparently the
community of social robotics accepts reciprocity as a
fact. However we consider that reciprocity should be
measured and compared in order to have a reference to
be used as a guideline in the design of new interactions.
Additionally, it is assumed that robots and other
machines should be cooperative with humans but these
studies have not considered reciprocity as a main fac-
tor in this phenomena. For instance, Fogg developed
the concept of persuasive machines [23,22,21], consid-
ering that humans have an instinctive behavior towards
devices that triggers feelings and emotions in response
to their persuasiveness. These feelings and emotions are
apparently reciprocal to the machines when they pro-
vide a good service or help. In other words, “If you are
nice to me, in the future I will be nice to you”.
Besides, negotiation is an activity which inherently
involves reciprocity in order to obtain satisfactory re-
sults for negotiators. Several studies have been done
with automated agents negotiating in different decision
scenarios. Lin and Kraus offer an extensive review of
these agents in [37]. The performance of the agents
varies statistically significantly depending on the sce-
nario and the internal design of the algorithms. More-
over, Kiesler et al. showed that humans show coopera-
tive behavior towards computers [32] playing Prisoner’s
Dilemma when they have a chance to interact inten-
sively with the agent. In this Prisoner’s Dilemma the
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cooperation is conditioned to the previous actions of
the other participants; if a player was cooperative or
defective that could condition the response of the op-
ponent in the next round (reciprocal behavior), so “I
will be nice with you now because in the future I ex-
pect that you will be nice to me too”. De Melo et al.
also used Moral Emotions (gratitude, anger, reproach,
sadness) to elicit cooperation with a virtual agent in 25
rounds of Prisoner’s Dilemma using a variety of Tit for
Tat strategy [39]. However none of these studies con-
sider reciprocity as a variable to be measured.
2.1 Game Theory as a research tool in HRI
To explore reciprocity we decided to use the insights of
Game Theory. The definition we use is as follows: “an
interdisciplinary theorist method that examines how
people make decisions when their actions and fates de-
pend on the actions of other people” [57]. We used
Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (RPDG) and Ultimatum
Game as the decision games that could offer us a quan-
titative reference of reciprocity in HRI. Both games are
a common research tool used to investigate other re-
lated phenomena as cooperation or negotiation allow-
ing simplification of different social situations. Addi-
tionally these games can be changed to model other
scenarios. For instance, Prisoner’s Dilemma could be
adjusted without modifying the essence of the game for
different situations where participants should take de-
cisions such as in wars, law enforcement, or duopoly
fights [52].
2.1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is frequently used as a
quantitative approach to study different phenomena.
Since Rapoport and Chammah proposed the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in 1965 [47] there have been different versions
of the experiment which differ in the terms of the de-
fection and collaboration required of the players. In the
original game two thieves are captured by the police and
interrogated separately. They can cooperate with each
other keeping quiet or they can defect confessing the
crime, but the punishment of both thieves depends of
the combination of cooperations or defections of each.
The rules are: “There are two players. Each has two
choices, namely cooperate or defect. Each must make
the choice without knowing what the other will do. No
matter what the other does, defection yields a higher
payoff than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both
defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated” [4].
One of the matrix versions of the game is shown in Ta-
ble 1 [52].
In Table 1 the numbers represent time in prison for
the participants in the game. The minus sign is a con-
vention to indicate that this time is subtracted from the
time of the criminal in the metaphor. To illustrate, if
Criminal 1 and Criminal 2 both cooperate (keep quiet),
both will spend just three months in jail. However, if
Criminal 1 cooperates and Criminal 2 defects, Crimi-
nal 1 will spend 12 months in jail and Criminal 2 will
be free. If both of them defect they will spend eight
months in jail. The game represents situations where





Defect (0,-12) ( -8,-8)
Table 1 Basic Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix
Defect offers the highest profit for the players when
the game is played once. Therefore strict dominance
here is Defect. Spaniel defines a strict dominance when
“We say that a strategy X strictly dominates strategy
Y for a player if strategy X provides a greater payoff
for that player than strategy Y regardless of what the
other players do.” [52]. In other words, when we have
a strict dominant strategy in a decision game it should
be clear for the participants what to decide in order to
get the highest profit. For a single round of Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Defect is the strict dominance strategy be-
cause it allows a player to avoid punishment. However
when many rounds are played, Cooperate or Defect are
possible strategies to reduce the punishment of both
players.
Diverse versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma have been
developed. For instance, Prisoner’s Dilemma can also be
played in consecutive rounds, which is called Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (RPDG) modality. In this
version, previous movements of the opponent become
a factor for the next movement of the player, who is
probably considering and recording the behavior of his
opponent [57]. Furthermore, about 20 strategies have
been tested in order to get a good score in the RPDG
[14,2]. According to Axelrod the strategy designed by
Rapoport, “Tit for Tat” (TfT) is the simplest and most
effective strategy to follow in the RPDG [4]. Tit for Tat
consists of cooperating in the first instance and then in
the next movement copying the decision of the other
participant did in the previous round. In two contests
organized by Axelrod in the 1980s different strategies
were tested. In both contests Tit for Tat was the winner
[3].
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2.1.2 Ultimatum Game
In this game, one of the participants (Proposer) de-
cides how to distribute a certain amount of money. The
second player (Acceptor) can decide to accept the dis-
tribution and both of them can keep the money. How-
ever, if the acceptor rejects the offer both of them lose
the money. Like Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ultimatum Game
has different variants. One is the mini Ultimatum Game
(mUG) in which participants decide upon a limited set
of defined distributions of money, for example, 50%-
50%, 20%-80%, 80%-20%, or other options [17]. For
this study, we use the mUG version of the Ultimatum
Game, and fixed the roles for the agent and the partic-
ipant. Participant is always the proposer and Agent is
the acceptor.
2.2 Studies of personality and reciprocity
Several researchers claim that human personality mat-
ters in games related to reciprocity such as Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Park et al. claim that the behavior in sit-
uations involving reciprocity is affected by personality
and the interactions of the parties following the norm
of reciprocity. In addition, they suggest that extrover-
sion, agreeableness and neuroticism personality traits
are related to cooperative strategies in conflict resolu-
tions. [44]. Boone et al. conducted an experiment which
deals with four personality traits: locus of control, self-
monitoring, type-A behavior and sensation seeking [5].
In addition, Chaudhuri et al., performed the Repeated
Play Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPPD) researching trusting
and reciprocal behavior [9]. They classified people with
different propensities to cooperate showing differing de-
grees of trust and reciprocity. They found that people
who chose to cooperate demonstrated higher levels of
trust. In contrast, in reciprocal behavior, differences be-
tween cooperative subjects and defectors were not sig-
nificant.
2.3 Research Questions
Our general research questions for this study are: Do
people reciprocate differently towards other humans in
comparison to robots? What consequences does the in-
teraction strategy of the robot have on the humans’
reciprocal behavior? In order to answer these questions
we developed the following sub questions:
1. Do participants behave differently towards robots
compared to other humans in terms of reciproca-
tion, collaboration and the offer they make in the
ultimatum game (Offer)?
2. Do participants behave differently towards agents
that use the TfT strategy in comparison to how they
behave with agents that use the Random strategy
in terms of reciprocation, collaboration and the offer
they make in the Ultimatum Game (Offer)?
3. Do participants win more money (Profit) when the
agent uses the TfT strategy compared to when the
agent uses the Random strategy?
4. Do participants and robots together win more money
(Joint Profit) when the agent uses the TfT strategy
compared to when the agent uses the Random strat-
egy?
5. Is there any correlation between Collaboration, Re-
ciprocation, Profit and Joint Profit?
6. Is the personality of the agent perceived differently
when the agent uses the TfT strategy compared to
when the agent is using the Random strategy and
how is this relationship mediated by the partici-
pants’ own personality?
3 Method
The aim of this paper is to model reciprocity with a
quantitative approach in order to understand the recip-
rocal actions of the participants towards the robots. We
used the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (RPDG).
The participants played ten rounds similar to the exper-
iment of Selten and Stocker who did a series of “super
games” playing 25 times in periods of ten rounds [49].
Then the participants played as proposer and the agent
as acceptor in the mini Ultimatum Game (mUG).
In our study the participants did not know how
many times they would play against the agent. That
means that their decisions would be conditioned by the
possibility of interacting with the agent in an undeter-
mined number of rounds. Apparently when people do
not know the number of rounds they tend to be more
reciprocal and collaborative due to the reputation of the
opponent in the previous rounds [34,1]. It is also neces-
sary to have multiple interactions to be able to evaluate
the personality of the opponent [9,28]. That could have
an impact in the long-term relationships between hu-
mans and robots. It takes several rounds of playing the
game to get an impression of the strategy of the op-
ponent [51]. However, cooperation is not stable along
the RPDG and it tends to deteriorate when the game
is played anonymously over ten rounds [19,29].
In order to answer our research questions we de-
veloped a 2x2 mixed within/between experiment. The
between factor was the agent, which could be either a
human or a robot. The within factors were the strate-
gies played by the agent, which could be either Tit for
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Tat (cooperate in the first movement and then do what-
ever the other participant did in the previous move) or
Random strategy.
We ran our experiment using robot agents and hu-
man agents in order to compare the behavior of the
participants under the same controlled conditions. We
used two robots, one of them customized with stick-
ers, to avoid the possibility that the judgments of par-
ticipants for the second within-condition would be in-
fluenced by the experiences made with the robot in
the first within-condition. The participants would ei-
ther first play with a robot that used the Tit for Tat
strategy or with a robot that would use the Random
strategy. In addition, we changed the robot every set of
games, so either robot “A” or robot “B” would be the
robot that used the Tit for Tat strategy. This compar-
ison is a typical study of effectiveness of the strategies
in Prisoner’s Dilemma [4,2,45]. After one round of ten
games of Prisoner’s Dilemma the participants played
one round of Ultimatum Game.
We followed the same setup for the human condi-
tion. Two male confederates were available to play ver-
sus the participants. We cannot control the physical
appearance of the human agents; however, we asked
them to be neutral and interact as little possible with
the participant and avoid conversation. They would just
respond nodding to the greeting of the participant at
the very beginning and listening to the same instruc-
tions given to the participants. The participants did not
know that they were playing with a confederate.
3.1 Measurements
One of the researchers recorded manually all the actions
of the participants and the agent. The actions included
the behaviors in every round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (collaborate or defect). The record also contained
how much money the participants were left with after
each session. Participants and agents pointed out to the
cards with the words “Cooperate” or “Defect”. In ad-
dition, the log included the decision of the participants
in the two Ultimatum games of each round.
The variables were the number of Cooperations and
Reciprocations done in every set of Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Offer made in Ultimatum Game. The num-
ber of Cooperations (frequency of cooperation) along
the game was the variable that allowed us calculate the
number of reciprocations (frequency of reciprocations).
The number of reciprocal movements was calculated
by counting the number of cooperative choices of the
agent followed by the cooperative choice of the partici-
pant plus the number of defective choices of the agent
followed by defective choices of the participant. See Fig-
ure 1
Fig. 1 Example of the computation of Cooperations and Re-
ciprocations
A computer-based questionnaire recorded the demo-
graphic data. The same computer was used to apply the
TIPI Test developed by Goslig et al [25] that was used
to evaluate the Big Five traits of personality (extro-
version, agreeableness, conscientiousness,neuroticism or
emotional stability and openness)in the participant and
the perception of personality of the agents. We chose
this test because it could be answered by the partici-
pant in a short time provides reliable results.
Also, we tried to discover how humans and robots
reach a goal. In this case the money used in the exper-
iment is an outcome to measure how reciprocity affects
joint tasks. A probable question of the reader about this
experiment is: Why use money if robots do not need
it? We must keep in mind that the original metaphor
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma describes a scenario avoiding
spending time in jail. Money represents this time in jail.
It is a token; a tangible representation of this metaphor.
Robots don’t need money; however, the coins used in
the game are useful because can show us how humans
and robots can perform a task together according to
the degree of reciprocity between them. The less money
humans and robots lose can be compared with the less
time they spend in the hypothetical jail.
3.2 Development of the experiment
The experiment consisted of four phases which are shown
in Figure 2. Participants were welcomed and taken to
the experimentation room. In the case of the human
condition actors arrived roughly at the same time and
were in another room pretending to fill the same ques-
tionnaires as the real participant. Once in the room,
the participants completed the consent form and filled
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in the demographic and personality questionnaire (TIPI
Test). Then, the metaphor of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game was used to explain the structure of the RPDG
used in this experiment. The rules of the game were
stated before the participants played two trial rounds
against the agent. The participants were informed that
they could keep whatever money would be left at the
end of the game.
Fig. 2 Step-by-Step procedure for the participant.
After that, the experimenter explained the Ultima-
tum game and participants played one trial round with
the same agent. The experimenter explained that the
participant would be the proposer. The agents made
the same pre-determined responses during the trials.
The word “robot” was changed in the card by the word
“agent” in the human condition.Three cards with differ-
ent distribution of money were in the table. The par-
ticipants chose one card and showed it to the agent.
The participants were told that the agent would now
make a choice whether to accept the offer or not. The
agent was instructed to always accept the offer but the
participants were not made aware of this fact.
After the practice session, participants continued
with the second phase in which they played a first Pris-
oner game and started with NZ $6.50. Each session con-
sisted of 10 rounds of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma [28]
against an agent followed by one round of Ultimatum
Game in a common face-to-face configuration. At the
beginning of each Prisoner’s Dilemma round the referee
rang a bell to signal the players to make their choice.
After both players had chosen a card, the experimenter
removed the board to allow both players to see each
others decision. After that the participants gave the
money they had lost following the matrix. The experi-
menter took the money from the robot. Then the par-
ticipants played the Ultimatum Game with the agent.
When the game was over, the participant completed an
agent personality questionnaire on the computer. Dur-
ing that period, we changed the agent. This procedure
was clearly visible to the participants and the experi-
menter informed the participants that in the next ses-
sion they would be playing with a different agent. In the
case of the human agent we pretended that he would
fill in the questionnaire in other room.
In phase three, the participant then played a second
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and Ultimatum Game with
the other agent. If the first agent played Tit for Tat
then the second agent played the Random strategy. Af-
terwards the participants filled in the personality ques-
tionnaire for the new agent. Finally in phase four the
participants were asked to count their money and we
closed the experiment asking for their comments.
3.3 Setup
We used NAO Robots manufactured by Aldebaran [26].
One of the robots was customized with stickers. The
robots performed programmed movements, controlled
by a tele-operator hidden by a curtain. A hidden camera
(not recording) provided a video of the situation and
enabled the operator to enact both strategies. For the
human condition the actors followed a script and tried
to have a neutral behavior towards the participants.
They used similar clothes and had limited interaction
with the participants.
The experiment took place in a 3m x 3m area. In
order to reduce the distractions for the participants we
tried to keep the experimental area as minimalistic as
possible. The participants were seated on a table op-
posite the agent, because face-to-face configuration in-
creases collaboration amongst human players [51,29].
Oda claims that recognition of the opponent’s face is a
crucial factor when humans use a Tit for Tat strategy
in social interactions [43].
A sliding board was used to allow the agent and
participant to make private decisions in the Prisoner’s
dilemma game (see Figure 3). The referee was seated on
the side of the table and was able to remove the sliding
board in order to let the players see each others choice.
A second table was located in the corner of the room
for the computer with the questionnaires.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma was based on the matrix
shown in Table 2. The numbers are New Zealand dol-
lars that the participant lost depending on whether he
or she cooperated or defected. In this scenario defec-
tion is not punished and cooperative behavior is poorly
rewarded. The distribution of the money keeps the con-
figuration of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma, with 30
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Fig. 3 Setup of the experiment.
cents, 50 cents and 1 dollar rewards depending on the
combined actions. The participants received $6.50 in
coins at the beginning of each Prisoner’s Dilemma ses-






Defect (0,-1) ( -0.5,-0.5)
Table 2 Matrix used in the experiment. The values represent
the dollars that participant lose.
The choices of the agents using Random strategy
were based on four scripts of pseudo-random sequences
of movements. Each script consisted of five collabora-
tions and five defections. This quasi-random behavior
ensured that the agent would not make an extremely
low or high number of cooperations. The robot ran-
domly picked one the four scripts. As we explained in
2.1.1, Tit for Tat strategy is based on the previous de-
cision of the participants. For the first round that is
not possible hence the agent always picked “cooperate”
for its initial decision. The actors followed the same
strategies, they could read the scripts of the random
sequences during the game, and the script could not
viewed by the participant.
Two cards with the labels “Cooperate” and “De-
fect” were placed in front of the participant and a sec-
ond set in front of the agent. The participants and the
agents had to choose their behavior in the game point-
ing to one of the two cards in front of them. In the
Ultimatum Game participants used three pre-defined
options printed on cards [42]. The three options were:
(Robot 50% - Human 50%), (Robot 20% - Human 80%)
(Robot 80% - Human 20%). For the human condition
we changed the words on the cards to “Participant A”
and “Participant B”.
3.4 Participants
We used data 3 of sixty participants in the experiment:
30 in the robot condition and 30 in the human con-
dition. All of the participants were recruited at the
University of Canterbury and Facebook groups from
Christchurch. The nationalities were diverse: 38.3% were
from New Zealand, 18.3% Chinese and other Asian coun-
tries, 18.33% Latin Americans and Caribbeans, 5% In-
dians, 3.3% Middle East, 3.3% Russians and finally
13.3% from other Western Countries. Of the 60 par-
ticipants, 39 were men. The average age was 26.5 years
old (SD= 6.5); median 24.5. Only 40% of the partici-
pants had previous experience with a real robot.
In the robot condition the participants were 18 males
and 12 females, whose ages averaged 28.27 years (SD =
6.73). Nine came from New Zealand; the rest from over-
seas. Half of them were in paid employment. Thirteen
participants had previously interacted with a robot and
seventeen had not. In the human condition the partic-
ipants were 21 males and 9 females whose ages aver-
aged 24.7 years (SD=5.96). Fourteen came from New
Zealand and the rest from overseas. 73% were in a paid
employment. Eleven participants had previously inter-
acted with a robot and nineteen had not. All partic-
ipants received an explanation of the procedure and
signed the consent form. To raise their motivation, par-
ticipants were told that their compensation would be
how much they won in the games.
4 Results
We performed a mixed repeated measure ANOVA in
which Agent was the between subject factor and Strat-
egy was the within subject factor. The measurements
were Cooperations, Reciprocations, Offer, Profit and
Joint Profit. Figure 4 shows the medians and standard
deviations of Cooperations and Reciprocation measure-
ments across the four conditions. Figure 5 shows Profit,
Joint Profit and Offer in Ultimatum game along the
four conditions as well.
4.1 Differences between agents
Our first research question compares the agents in terms
of reciprocation, cooperation, profit, joint profit and the
3 Our data is available in http://goo.gl/NcKRBl as a .sav
file
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Fig. 4 Number of cooperations and reciprocations in the ex-
periment.
Fig. 5 Profit, Joint Profit and Offer made in Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Ultimatum Game.
offer that participants made in the Ultimatum Game.
We observed that participants that interacted with a
robot did not show significantly more reciprocations
(m=5.3, SD=2.019), than when they interacted with
a human agent (m=5.067, SD= 1.973), F(1,58)=0.349,
p=0.557. Furthermore, Participants that interacted with
a robot showed significantly fewer cooperations (m=4.15,
SD= 2.72) than when they interacted with a human
(m= 5.82, SD=3.13), F(1,58)= 6.889; p=0.011. Joint
Profit was significant affected by the type of agent, F
(1,58) = 6.418, p=0.014. Participants in the human con-
dition had on average a Joint Profit of $4.64 (SD=1.31)
and in the robot condition $4.05 (SD=1.11), not signifi-
cant difference found. Profit of participants in the robot
condition is in average $2.55, (SD=0.646) was not sig-
nificantly higher than the average profit made in the
human condition $2.39, (SD=0.976), F(1,58)= 1.778,
p= 0.188.
We ran a chi-square analysis of the Offer in Ultima-
tum Game treating data as nominal variables. The fre-
quency of the offers made to the human agent (f(50%)
= 53, f(20%)= 5, f(80%)= 2) is significantly different
from the offers made to the robot agent (f(50%)= 43,
f(20%)= 15, f(80%)= 2), χ2 = (2, N= 60)= 6.042 p=
0.039. In other words, reciprocations and profit were not
significantly affected by the type of agent. There is a
significant interaction effect between the agent and the
strategy for the profit of the participant, F(1,58)=5.842,
p=0.019. Participants who interacted with a human
agent that used the Random strategy won less money
than in the other conditions. A summary of the results
can be found in Table 3 in the top of the next page.
4.2 Differences between strategies
Our second research question was if participants behave
differently towards agents that use the TfT strategy in
comparison to agents that use the Random strategy in
terms of reciprocation, collaboration and the Offer they
make in the Ultimatum Game.
Participants who played with the agent that used
the TfT strategy collaborated (m=5.73, SD=3.39) sig-
nificantly more than when they played with the agent
that used the Random strategy (m= 4.23, SD=2.44),
F(1,58)= 15.982, p <0.01. Furthermore, participants
who played with the agent that used TfT strategy re-
ciprocated (m=5.65, SD=2.31) significantly more than
when they played with the agent that used the Ran-
dom strategy (m=4.72, SD=1.497), F(1,58)= 9.019; p
=.004.
We ran a chi square analysis in order to observe
how the strategy affects the frequencies of the offer
made to the agent in Ultimatum Game. The frequency
of the offers made when Random strategy (f(50%)=
47, f(20%)= 11, f(80%)= 2) was played is not signifi-
cantly different from the frequency of the offers made
when TfT strategy was played (f(50%)= 49, f(20%)=
9, f(80%)= 2), χ2 = (2, N= 60)=0.242 p=0.926.
In terms of money, the results show that partici-
pants who played with the agent that used TfT strategy
made an average profit of $2.64, (SD=0.58) significantly
higher than when they played with the agent that used
the Random strategy m=$2.3, (SD=0.99), F(1,58) =
4.239; p=0.044. Also participants who played with the
agent that used TfT strategy made an average Joint
Profit of $4.80, (SD=1.5) significantly higher than when
they played with the agent that used the Random strat-
egy m=$3.83, (SD=0.66), F(1,58)=28.913; p <0.01. A
summary of our analysis for question 2,3 and 4 is in
Table 4.
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Human vs Robot Robot Human
Variable F p-value Mean(SD) SE Mean(SD) SE
Reciprocations F(1,58)=0.349 0.557 5.3 (2.019) 0.261 5.067 (1.973) 0.255
Cooperations F(1,58)=6.889 0.011 4.15 (2.717) 0.351 5.817 (3.133) 0.404
Profit F(1,58)= 1.778 0.188 2.55 (0.646) 0.083 2.39 (0.976) 0.126
Joint Profit F(1,58)= 6.418 0.014 4.05 (1.108) 0.143 4.64 (1.309) 0.169
Table 3 Number of reciprocations and Profit were not significantly different between the agents. Number of cooperations and
Joint Profit were significantly different.
Tft vs Random TfT Strategy Random Strategy
Variable F p-value Mean(SD) SE Mean(SD) SE
Reciprocations F(1,58)= 9.019 0.004 5.65 (2.306) 0.298 4.717 (1.497) 0.193
Cooperations F(1,58)= 15.982 <0.01 5.733 (3.394) 0.438 4.233 (2.438) 0.315
Profit F(1,58)=4.239 0.044 2.645 (0.585) 0.075 2.3 (0.989) 0.127
Joint Profit F(1,58)=28.913 <0.01 4.807 (1.501) 0.193 3.833 (0.657) 0.084
Table 4 In terms of strategy; Reciprocations, Cooperations, Profit and Joint Profit were significantly different between
strategies.
4.3 Correlation between collaboration, reciprocation
and money
We wanted to know if there was any correlation between
Collaboration, Reciprocation, Profit and Joint Profit?
We conducted a multiple regression analysis between
Reciprocation, Collaboration, Profit, Joint Profit and
Offer. The Pearson Correlation Coefficients are shown
in Table 5. Reciprocation was significantly positively
correlated with Collaboration, Profit and Joint Profit.
Joint Profit is significantly positively correlated with
Collaboration and Profit. Also, Offer is significantly
positively correlated with Profit.
Rec Coop Prof Jprof
Coop *0.182
Prof *0.241 -0.065
Jprof *0.405 *0.872 *0.281
Offer -0.019 0.008 *0.258 -0.033
Table 5 Pearson Correlation between Reciprocation and
Collaboration, Profit, Joint Profit and Offer. The * sign indi-
cates a significance level of p<0.05. Rep= Reciprocity, Coop=
Cooperation, Prof=Profit, Jprof=Joint Profit
The regression equation is:
Reciprocation = 0.133 + (−0.68 × Collaboration)+
(−0.557 × Profit) + (2.211 × Joint Profit)+
(0.754 × Offer)
(1)
The model is able to explain 0.310% of the variance
in the Reciprocation model.
4.4 The personality traits as factors in the experiment
We asked whether the personality of the agent is per-
ceived differently when the agent uses the TfT strat-
egy compared to when the agent is using the Random
strategy, and how this relationship is mediated by the
participant’s own personality. We conducted a mixed
repeated measure ANCOVA in which the agent was the
between factor, strategy was the within factor and the
personality traits of the participant were the covariants.
The perceived personality traits of the agent were the
dependent variables.
Our analysis shows that agent had a significant in-
fluence on the perception of the agent’s agreeableness,
F(1,58)=4.263, p=0.044. Participants who interacted
with a robot agent perceived less agreeableness (m=
4.067, SD=1.361) compared to participants interacting
with a human agent (m=4.517,SD=1.017). Also agent
had a significant influence on the perception of the
agent’s openness. Participants who interacted with a
robot agent perceived less openness (m=3.458, SD=
1.488) compared to participants interacting with a hu-
man agent (m=4.408, SD=0.95), F(1,58)=8.682, p=
0.005. However, agent did not have a significant effect
on perceived extroversion of the agent (F(1,58)=0.102,
p= 0.750), conscientiousness (F(1,58)= 0.113, p=0.738)
or emotional stability (F(1,58)=0.005, p=0.944).
Participants that played with the agent that used
the TfT strategy scored the agent significantly (F(1,58)
= 4.865, p=0.032) lower on Extroversion (m=3.533,
SD=1.1963) than when they played with the agent us-
ing the Random Strategy (m=3.558, SD= 1.1648). Also,
participants that played with the agent that used the
TfT strategy scored the agent significantly (F(1,58)=
3.586, p=0.064) higher on agreeableness (m=4.5, SD=
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1.30, SE=0.168) than when they played with the agent
using the Random Strategy (m= 4.083, SD=1.097, SE=
0.141).
However, strategy did not have a significant effect in
perceived Openness (F(1,58)=1.94, p=0.17), Conscien-
tiousness (F(1,58)=1.902, p=0.174), or Emotional Sta-
bility (F(1,58)=0.301, p=0.586). Interaction effect be-
tween strategy and participant conscientious appeared
on the perceived extroversion (F(1,58)=6.047, p=0.017)
and agreeableness (F(1,58) = 4.569, p=0.037) of the
agent.
In summary, Agent had a significant influence on the
perception of the agent’s agreeableness and openness.
The robot agent was perceived as less agreeable and
less open than the human agent. Agent didn’t have any
influence in the perceived agent’s extroversion, consci-
entiousness or emotional stability. Strategy had an in-
fluence in the perceived agents’ extroversion and agree-
ableness, but not in the agents’ perceived openness,
conscientiousness or emotional stability. An agent us-
ing TfT strategy was scored lower in extroversion and
higher in agreeableness compared with agents that used
Random strategy. An agent’s perceived extroversion and
agreeableness were affected by an interaction effect be-
tween strategy and the participant’s conscientious.
We also investigated the influence of the partici-
pants’ personality traits on the perceived personality
of the agents. We explored this relationship using the
covariants. The results show that participants’ extro-
version had a significant effect on the perceived level of
the agents’ emotional stability (also called neuroticism)
(F(1,58)= 7.907, p= 0.007). Also participants’ agree-
ableness had a significant effect on the perceived level
of the agents’ openness (F(1,58)= 7.680, p= 0.008).
Participants’ openness had a significant effect on the
perceived level of the agents’ agreeableness (F(1,58)=
5.795, p= 0.020) and agents’ emotional stability (F(1,58)
= 5.192, p= 0.027). All the effects are positive corre-
lated among them.
The influence of the personality traits in the partic-
ipants as covariants for the perceived personality traits
in the agent are shown in Table 6.





Table 6 Covariants related with perceived personality traits
in the agent.
4.5 Our Results compared with literature
We compared the results in both robot and human con-
ditions using the Tit for Tat strategy with the results
obtained from the study reported as the Flood-Dresher
experiment in [46,57] in terms of cooperation in RPDG.
They reported that in 100 rounds of RPDG participants
decided to collaborate in average 68% of the rounds.
We performed a one-sample t-test to compare the data
from our human and robot condition to this value. In
both conditions, human agent and robot agent, there
were fewer Cooperations. Participants cooperate signif-
icantly less (48.3% of the rounds) with the robot com-
pared with 68% reported in the Flood-Dresher experi-
ment, (t(29)= 7.095, p<0.01). Also, participants coop-
erate significantly less (66.3% of the rounds) with the
human agent in our experiment compared with 68% re-
ported in the Flood-Dresher experiment, (t(29)= 9.623,
p<0.01). Although this is a significant difference it does
not have practical implications. The difference between
the means is minimal. In general terms we can say that
our results are in line with the results shown in the
Flood-Dresher experiment, and the slight difference can
be attributed to uncontrolled variables in both experi-
ments.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results and the literature review show that peo-
ple tend to cooperate more with a human agent than
with robots. However, our results also showed no signif-
icant difference in the number of reciprocations in both
agents. Apparently the participants tend to be simi-
larly reciprocal with humans and robots. The Norm of
Reciprocity seems to apply to Human-Robot Interac-
tion using the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework. Further-
more, our experimental results show that people are
reciprocal with both cooperation and defection, which
is in line with the definition of reciprocity proposed by
Fehr and Gachter [20].
In terms of the strategy, participants reciprocated
more with the agents who used TfT. That seems nat-
ural considering that other studies have shown that
TfT strategy is intrinsically a reciprocal strategy. Par-
ticipants also cooperate more with the agents playing
TfT. However, it must be considered that cooperative
behavior is the most profitable strategy in single Pris-
oner’s Dilemma but not in RPDG. Dawes pointed out
that subjects contribute in the game because they have
high expectations about the contributions of others [15].
Therefore the number of interactions is a factor that
should be considered carefully in the design of recipro-
cal behaviors for companion robots.
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In addition, TfT strategy increases the cooperations
of the participants (m=5.733) compared with the Ran-
dom strategy (m=4.233). TfT strategy encourages co-
operation in the participants with an initial cooperation
that can be perceived as a cooperative attitude. This
strategy had an effect in the Profit and Joint Profit
due to the number of cooperations and reciprocations.
A higher number of cooperations reduces the loss of
money per participant. A combination of cooperative
behaviors in both participant and agent allows both to
increase their own profits. Consequently a higher in-
dividual profit amounts to a higher Joint Profit. Par-
ticipants tended to have a higher Joint Profit with a
robot agent than with the human agent. However the
participants profit was not significantly affected by the
agent. The higher Joint Profit can be explained by the
combination of agent-strategy in every stage of the ex-
periment. In other words, participants would be guess-
ing the strategy of the agent before seeing a pattern in
the first round of games, and then they could define a
stable strategy in the second round.
Also, we compared the number of cooperations us-
ing the Tit for Tat strategy with the results reported
as the Flood-Dresher experiment in [46,57]. They re-
ported that in 100 rounds of RPDG participants de-
cided to collaborate in average 68% of the rounds. In
our study participants cooperate with the robot agent
in 48.3% of the rounds and with the human agent in
66.3% of the rounds. On the other hand, de Melo et al.
reported in [39] that participants cooperate more with a
virtual agent that shows moral emotions (66.28%, 12.57
of 25 rounds) rather than agent that doesn’t shows any
emotion (51.57%, 12.893 of 25 rounds). The agent used
Random strategy in rounds 1 to 5 and TfT strategy
in rounds 6 to 25. These results are very close to the
results obtained in our study. This could be consistent
to fact that participants perceive moral agents as more
human-like as de Melo et al. reported. In our study
robot agents didn’t show any emotion and we trained
human agents in order to reduce any emotional expres-
sion.
Besides, participants offer significantly less money
in average in the Ultimatum game to the robot than to
the human agent. Furthermore, according to our chi-
square analysis participants made 50%-50% offers more
infrequently to the robot than to the human agent. We
expected that the offer in the Ultimatum Game would
be affected by the strategy performed independently
of the agent in the Prisoner’s dilemma. Humans are
known to typically reject offers that are 80%-20% [42]
Ṫhus players play safe most of the time, offering a 50%-
50% offer to the agent. However, according to the final
comments of some participants playing with the robot,
they wanted to experiment with different offers just to
see the reaction of the robot.
People perceived higher openness and agreeableness
in the human agent. However the agent did not have a
significant effect in the other personality traits. This can
be explained by the personality of the actors playing
human agents. Although we asked to the actors to keep
themselves neutral and reduce the communication to
minimal; we could not control the subtle body language
and the gaze that could affect the perception of the
participants.
When the agents played TfT strategy it was per-
ceived as more extroverted and agreeable than when
they played Random strategy. Probably participants
perceived a subtle pattern playing TfT that they re-
lated with these two personality traits. If the agents
started the game cooperating it is probable that peo-
ple recognized that their agreeableness and extroversion
related to a higher number of collaborations, reciproca-
tions, profit and join profit.
Relationships between personality traits, agents and
strategy can be useful as guidelines for the robot design-
ers. Robot designers could make efforts in the design of
robot behaviors and strategies matching with the per-
sonality of the users and triggering reciprocity in the
user. We could say that under certain social situations
extroverted people would tend to work in a better way
with robots. Hirsh and Peterson have studied the influ-
ence of extroversion and neuroticism, personality traits
in the Big Five test using the Prisoner’s dilemma. They
found that extroversion and neuroticism traits predict
a greater likelihood of cooperation [28].
5.1 Contribution of our study
Results of our study suggest that reciprocity exists in
Human-Robot Interaction under Prisoner’s Dilemma
scenario. Certainly Prisoner’s Dilemma can be adapted
to other social situations which involve interactions and
decisions between different agents. This study helps us
to understand the importance of the strategy used by
the agent in order to receive a reciprocal treatment.
The implications in the design of companion robots can
be significant in terms that robot designers should con-
sider that the behavior of their robots (independently of
other variables as embodiment or anthropomorphism)
must be aimed to follow a similar pattern as the Tit for
Tat strategy. It is easy to imagine different scenarios in
which this pattern could appear in HRI. For instance,
companion robots in the role of an assistant could of-
fer their services and then predict the actions of the
users. If the user wants a companion, the robot would
also show itself keen to offer companionship; if the user
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rejects the presence of the robot then the robot would
also indicate that it did not require the user. However,
this raises questions about predictability, such as: What
is the the threshold to be reciprocal with the user? Do
humans expect some unpredictability in robots in order
to maintain attention on them?
In general terms, we can explain our results with the
media equation theory [41] and the natural identifica-
tion of patterns. Humans tend to treat objects as other
social actors; therefore, they tend to be similarly re-
ciprocal with them. Furthermore, Turkle in [54] claims
that actual users are focused on the outcomes of the ex-
perience rather than on the agent, and for the youngest
people it does not matter if the player of a certain so-
cial activity is a robot or a sentient being if this agent
reaches the goal to entertain or do something else for
the users . Thus, we can consider that robots will re-
ceive a reciprocal treatment similar to what humans
receive in scenarios similar to the Prisoners Dilemma
and Ultimatum Game. However we can even raises the
question Why do the participants actually reciprocate
equally to humans and robots? Because they treat the
robot as a human, or because they think that this is
the most promising strategy. Certainly these questions
should be require further study.
Aditionally, we can go back to the question: Do peo-
ple reciprocate towards robots in a similar way to how
they reciprocate with humans? We can say that if it
were possible to situate Prisoner’s Dilemma and Ulti-
matum Game in different social situations people would
be reciprocal with robots. Although people tended to
be less collaborative with robots than with humans in
our experiment; reciprocation is similar. If robots show
a cooperative behavior people would tend to respond
in the same way, and would tend to respond with the
same attitude. Of course, the social situations involving
HRI are more complex than that. For instance, scenar-
ios involving negotiation between robots and humans
require the analysis of other variables.
Finally if we try to answer the hypothetical question
of Kahn et al. of whether people can engage substan-
tively in a reciprocal relationship with robots, we can
say that it is possible if the robot first shows a recipro-
cal behavior toward humans like in Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Furthermore, we can discuss how companion robots can
engage in a positive reciprocal relationship with humans
if the companion robots have an efficient strategy like
TfT. Robot designers should work on designing recipro-
cal strategies that increase the collaboration in HRI to
the same level as in HHI. However more studies should
be done in order to explain all the future social impli-
cations in the field. This studio should be a first step
towards a better understating of the importance of reci-
procity in the use of companion robots.
We consider that there will be many activities in
which companion robots and humans would need to
work cooperatively. However this cooperation could be
closely related to reciprocal behavior. Although Broz
and Lehnman claim that we would not feel any recipro-
cal feeling towards robots such as compassion [8], there
are other studies that claim that people naturally tend
to be reciprocal with machines (computers, mobile de-
vices, cars) in terms that these objects offer a benefit to
the user and the user takes care of them. Logically the
user takes care of his/her objects to keep them working
offering service, help or benefit to the user. Indeed, a
critical future work is the development of companion
robots capable of showing the proper actions, behav-
iors and social clues to encourage a reciprocal behavior
in the users. As Breazel claims, the development of so-
ciable robots involves interpretation of intentional and
unintentional acts, subjectivity, (showing rudiments of
intentional behavior), proto-dialogue, consistency and
expressive characteristics of emotion in voice, face, ges-
ture and posture [6]. Furthermore, Dautenhahn claims
that social robots would be socially evocative, socially
situated, sociable and socially intelligent [12]. All these
robotic skills involve reciprocity.
5.2 Limitations and future work
As so often in HRI studies, the participants had only
very limited previous experiences with robots. 56.7%
(17 of 30) of the participants in the robot condition
had never interacted with a robot before. This may have
lead to a novelty effect that could have substantiated
itself in a tendency of the participants to explore this
new experience rather than focusing on winning the
game.
Reciprocity is a very complex social phenomenon.
As a future work we will study HRI scenarios in which
it is not clear how the decisions are clearly taken; for
instance scenarios involving bribery or unfair behav-
iors. Moreover, deeper studies should be conducted to
explore whether reciprocal interactions generate more
engaging interactions.
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